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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel risk assessment method for power network fail-
ures considering a uniform-pricing market environment, different from previ-
ous risk assessment studies, which mainly emphasize technical consequences
of the failures. In this type of market, dispatch infeasibilities caused by line
failures are solved using a counter-trading mechanism where costs arise as a
result of correcting the power dispatch. The risk index proposed takes into
account these correction costs as well as the cost of the energy not served due
to the failure, while considering an oligopolistic behavior of the generation
companies. A 3-stage model is proposed to simulate the bidding behavior in
the market, under different line failures scenarios. The risk index proposed
and the method for its calculation are applied on an adapted IEEE 6-bus
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reliability test system. A sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the
sensitivity of the results with respect to the level of competitiveness of the
generation companies, measured by the conjectured-price response parameter
which is assumed to be exogenous in our study.
Keywords:
Risk assessment, Transmission network, Electricity market, Line failure,
Conjectural-variation equilibrium, Direct-current optimal power flow.
List of symbols
Indices:
a network bus index
i generation companies (GenCos) index
j generation unit index
k generation unit index (alias for j)
l transmission line index
Sets:
N set of indices of network buses
I set of indices of generation companies (GenCos)
J set of indices of generation units
Ja set of indices of generation units located on bus a
Ji set of indices of generation units belonging to GenCo i
L set of indices of the transmission lines in the system
Π set of optimization variables in the DAM problem
∆ set of optimization variables in the BM problem
Ξ set of optimization variables in the DC-OPF problem
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Constants:
cj production cost of unit j (e)
qj maximum production capacity of unit j (MW)
θi conjectured-price response of company i in the day-ahead market
[(e/MWh)/MW)
βi conjectured-price response of company i in the upwards balancing
market [(e/MWh)/MW)
φi conjectured-price response of company i in the downwards balancing
market [(e/MWh)/MW)
D total active power demand in the system (MW)
Da total active power demand per network bus a (MW)
MCj marginal cost of unit j (e/ MWh)
censa cost of energy not served at network bus a (e/ MWh)
ms(a,a′) mechanical state of transmission line connecting bus a and a
′
B(a,a′) transmission line susceptance (p.u.)
ORl transmission line outage rate per year
Tl transmission line average outage duration (hr)
Hrs transmission line total number of operating hours per year (hr)
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Variables:
λi day-ahead market price estimation by GenCo i (e/ MWh)
γi upwards balancing market price estimation by GenCo i (e/ MWh)
ψi downwards balancing market price estimation by GenCo i (e/ MWh)
λ∗ day-ahead market equilibrium price (e/ MWh)
γ∗ upwards balancing market equilibrium price (e/ MWh)
ψ∗ downwards balancing market equilibrium price (e/ MWh)
qDAMj non-equilibrium solution for the active power quantity bid of unit j
(MW) in the day-ahead market
q∗DAMj equilibrium solution for the active power quantity bid of unit j in the
day-ahead market (MW)
xBMj non-equilibrium solution for the upwards power quantity bid of unit j
in the balancing market (MW)
x∗BMj equilibrium solution for the upwards power quantity bid of unit j in
the balancing market(MW)
zBMj non-equilibrium solution for the downwards power quantity bid of unit
j in the balancing market (MW)
z∗BMj equilibrium solution for the downwards power quantity bid of unit j
in the balancing market (MW)
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µj dual variable
νj dual variable
ξj dual variable
δj dual variable
uOPFj binary variable equals to 1 if unit j is required to participate in the
upwards balancing market and 0 otherwise
uOPFa binary variable equals to 1 if any unit on bus a is required to participate
in the upwards balancing market and 0 otherwise
wOPFj binary variable equals to 1 if unit j is required to participate in the
downwards balancing market and 0 otherwise
wOPFa binary variable equals to 1 if any unit on bus a is required to participate
in the downwards balancing market and 0 otherwise
xvga amount of energy not served at network bus a (MWh)
qOPFj feasible active production for unit j as found in the optimal power flow
problem (MW)
F(a,a′) power flow in the network line connecting bus a and a
′
δa voltage angle at network bus a
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Acronyms:
BM Balancing Market
DAM Day-Ahead Market
DB Downwards Balancing
DC-OPF Direct-Current - Optimal Power Flow
ELIC Expected Load Interruption Cost
ELNS Expected Load Not Supplied
ENS Energy Not Served
KKT Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
MCP Mixed Complementarity Problem
M.O. Market Operator
S.O. System Operator
UB Upwards Balancing
VG Virtual Generator
1. Introduction1
Safety and reliability have always been critical for power systems [1]. A2
number of studies have been dedicated to propose different criteria [2], as-3
sessment methods [3], metrics, and standards [4]. More recently, the focus4
has been on studying power systems reliability considering distributed gen-5
eration [5], the integration of renewable energy sources [6] especially wind [7]6
and photovoltaic [8], the impact of severe weather conditions [9], and the im-7
pact of energy storage [10] and electric vehicles integration [11]. In addition,8
reliability studies have considered the contribution of demand response pro-9
gram [12], smart-grid developments [13] and cyber-security [14]. Moreover,10
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the deregulation of the power systems and the introduction of different mar-11
ket designs have motivated studies of system reliable operation considering12
different market interactions, such as the uncertainties of renewable power13
generation [15], the consideration of micro-grids [16], and especially ensuring14
markets adequately operating for energy reserves [17].15
However, reliability assessments may not tell the full story when consid-16
ering the actual impact of a failure in the system, as that effect is typically17
evaluated in terms of probability and severity (consequence), within a risk18
assessment framework [18]. A power system consists of many components19
(e.g. generators, transmission and distribution lines, transformers, breakers,20
switches, communication devices, etc.) which are prone to failures. Since21
most of these components can be -either directly or indirectly- attributed to22
the transmission and distribution networks, the available literature has been23
notably focusing on quantifying the impacts of failures in these networks.24
A network contingency can be considered to result in one or both of the25
following effects on the system: the isolation of a demand/generation bus26
from the rest of the system leading to an amount of energy not served (ENS),27
and/or the congestion of one or several other lines in the network due to the28
updated network topology and the limited capacity for each line, leading29
to the need of re-dispatching the generated power to ensure the technical30
stability of the network and to minimize any unsatisfied demand. If a line31
failure produces neither of these effects, then the line can be considered32
redundant and its failure has no influence on the operation of the system.33
In literature, the severity of network failures has regarded technical im-34
pacts such as circuit flow limits and voltage level violation, duration and fre-35
7
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
quency of interruption, amount of energy not supplied (ENS) and expected36
load not supplied (ELNS), and economic impacts such as the expected load37
interruption cost (ELIC), and ENS cost.38
Reference [19] presents a probabilistic risk assessment of distributed gen-39
eration (DG) systems, considering extreme weather conditions. They con-40
sider the probability of a distribution line contingency and its consequence41
as the extent of voltage level violation. Reference [20] also proposes a risk42
assessment method for power systems in extreme weather conditions with43
the amount of load curtailed as a severity function. References [21] analyzes44
a distribution network with DG, considering the risk of protection system45
miss-coordination, under three severity functions: interruption frequency,46
interruption duration and amount of ENS. A probabilistic risk assessment47
of transmission network contingencies is proposed in: [22] as the extent of48
thermal rating violation, [23] within a risk-based multi-objective optimiza-49
tion that accounts for overload risk, low voltage risk, and cost, [24] in terms50
of voltage level violation for a near-future condition, and in [25] in terms51
of line overload for wind-integrated power systems. Reference [26] considers52
the risk of transmission network deliberate outage within a network expan-53
sion planning framework, in terms of the amount of load shed. References54
[27] propose a method to evaluate the risk of transmission network failure in55
terms of load not supplied, while considering the operator responding to the56
failure by re-dispatching the power to avoid a system blackout and minimize57
the amount of load-shed. Reference [28] evaluates the security of a wind58
integrated power system using a risk index assessing the outage of a single59
and/or a double circuit of a line, and its economic consequence in terms of60
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ELIC. Study [29] proposes a risk assessment for the combined transmission61
and distribution networks within a hierarchical framework, with four severity62
functions namely: expected energy not supplied (EENS), probability of load63
curtailement (PLC), expected frequency of load curtailement (EFLC) and64
the equivalent duration of one complete system outage during peak condi-65
tions. Finally, the work [30] implements a risk analysis within a planning66
framework for the distribution network which accounts for the consequence67
of overcurrents and voltage violations in monetary terms. All of these stud-68
ies, however, have considered a system with centralized power dispatch. A69
power market context has been considered in the risk evaluation proposed70
by [31], where the merit order power dispatch is selected based on sampled71
bidding prices and the network failure severity is measured in terms of ENS72
cost.73
On the contrary to our knowledge, none of the existing works have eval-74
uated the system risk considering the economic cost of correcting the power75
dispatch due to the network contingency, within a market context. In fact,76
some studies have argued that the use of economic indexes for risk assessment77
such as the cost of interruption or the re-dispatching cost is not suitable, as78
it presupposes the decision itself that the index is ought to facilitate [24],79
or because it introduces uncertainties beyond those reflected by performance80
measures, that are difficult to model accurately [22]. The first argument,81
however, gives exception to cases where load interruptions are inevitable and82
are, therefore, not the result of an operator decision [24], which is, indeed,83
the case for many of the network failures scenarios. Moreover, we argue that84
in a market context where the electricity supplied and demanded are traded85
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and are subject to various price signals, it is important to analyze the global86
economic severity of the different contingencies.87
In this work, we propose a risk assessment method which considers the88
economic severity of network failures in terms of both the cost of ENS and the89
cost of correcting the dispatch in the network, in a market context. We con-90
sider a uniform pricing market with a counter-trading mechanism for clearing91
network infeasibilities in case of line failures and oligopolistic generation com-92
panies (GenCos) that are able to act strategically and exercise market power.93
The uniform-pricing market, the zonal market, and the nodal pricing market94
are the three market schemes dominantly adopted in deregulated systems95
[32]. However, when it comes to the need of congestion management which96
could arise due to a network contingency, the nodal pricing schemes internal-97
ize the congestion costs in the energy prices at each node [33], and therefore98
no subsequent mechanism or pricing is needed to manage this congestion.99
This is not the case for a uniform-pricing market, or within each zone in the100
zonal market, which are the market schemes implemented in most western101
European countries. Several works have studied the effects of network conges-102
tion on the performance of a uniform-pricing electricity market and especially103
in terms of strategic bidding and exercise of market power. Most notably,104
reference [33] compares nodal pricing and counter-trading mechanisms for105
managing network congestion in electricity markets. In doing so, they study106
the effect of counter-trading on the generation companies strategic bidding107
in the day-ahead market (DAM) and on overall social welfare, by evaluating108
the potential benefits of introducing additional competition. They show that109
under counter-trading, the new entrant in the export constrained area can110
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collect additional profits, resulting in over-investment in this area, and in a111
welfare loss for the society. Reference [34] analyzes the congestion influence112
on GenCos bidding strategies by providing an analytical framework for solv-113
ing a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, representing the GenCos interaction114
in a uniform-pricing market. They show that congestion in the transmission115
network may increase the GenCos ability to exercise market power, result-116
ing in higher prices. Both approaches, however, are only aimed at providing117
insights on the above-mentioned effects and therefore have limited applica-118
bility to large size problems. Study [35] address the same issue by proposing119
a conjectural-variation equilibrium problem to model the GenCos strategic120
interaction in the uniform-pricing market. The equilibrium problem is cast121
as an equivalent quadratic minimization that can be readily solved with com-122
mercial solvers. The framework proposed includes a Direct-Current Optimal123
Power Flow (DC-OPF) model to solve the network power dispatch. A simi-124
lar framework to study the effect of network congestion on GenCos strategic125
bidding is proposed in [36]; however, the network congestion is considered as126
the level of voltage level violation, instead of active power flow violation, and127
an AC-OPF model is implemented, instead of the DC-OPF.128
All of the above studies internalize the effect of counter-trading on the129
GenCos strategic bidding in the DAM. Namely, they consider that since net-130
work congestions are a recurring phenomenon, GenCos can anticipate its131
effect, and internalize it by optimizing their bids both in the DAM and the132
subsequent counter-trading mechanism, simultaneously. While this is suit-133
able for the purpose of their studies, we defer in that we consider an explicit134
separation between the GenCos bidding in the DAM and that of the subse-135
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quent correction mechanism, which we refer to as the balancing market (BM).136
This is because we consider congestion situations which arise exclusively due137
to network contingencies, that occur unexpectedly, and less often during nor-138
mal power system operation, and therefore it is highly unlikely that GenCos139
would change their strategies in the DAM to take them into account. Gen-140
Cos can still, however, react to such contingencies by adapting their offers141
in the BM, in order to maximize their profits. This explicit separation also142
helps emphasizing the cost of the dispatch correction arising due to the net-143
work contingency, especially for risk assessment and comparison purposes.144
Moreover, since anticipating and internalizing network congestions in the145
DAM offering would constitute solving a model represented as an Equilib-146
rium Problem with Equilibrium Constraint (EPEC) [37], that is non-linear147
and non-convex, iterative solution methods such as that presented in [35] are148
necessary to solve it, and it is often very difficult to achieve convergence and149
to validate the solutions obtained.150
For the risk assessment, we propose a 3-stage model to simulate the dereg-151
ulated power system behavior in case of a network failure, consisting of a152
conjectural-variation equilibrium model simulating the GenCos competition153
in the day-ahead uniform pricing market (DAM), a direct-current optimal154
power flow model (DC-OPF) to obtain the feasible dispatch in the network,155
and a conjectural-variation equilibrium model to simulate the counter-trading156
mechanism. We finally propose a risk index to quantify the economic impact157
of the different line failures. The method is tested on a 6-bus system adapted158
from the IEEE 6-bus Reliability Test System [38], and the results are pre-159
sented and discussed.160
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in details161
the uniform-pricing market scheme under study and illustrates the model as-162
sumptions and formulation. Section 3 illustrates the solution method adopted163
to solve the 3-stage model. Section 4 describes in details the numerical ex-164
ample used in this study. Section 5 presents and explains the risk assessment165
results. Section 6 provides a sensitivity analysis for the risk index proposed166
with respect to the level of competitiveness assumed for the different GenCos167
and Section 7 concludes the work.168
2. Model assumption and formulation169
In electricity markets, competing GenCos who wish to produce have to170
participate in the day ahead market (DAM), by offering to the market opera-171
tor (M.O.) hourly bids that consist of quantities and price pairs for next day172
production schedule. The M.O. aggregates all the supply bids, and collects173
and aggregates all the demand bids to construct the supply-demand curve.174
The M.O. re-arranges all the bids received from the suppliers in an ascend-175
ing order in terms of prices (each generation unit considered separately) and176
each bid received from the demand in a descending order, until the total177
generation equals the total demand. Thus, the market marginal price is set178
to the bid price of the most expensive unit committed for dispatch. In a179
uniform pricing market, this price will be the same used for the remuner-180
ation of all the units committed. If we do not take into consideration the181
network representation, it is very probable that the schedule resulting from182
the market clearing may not be technically feasible (e.g. may exceed the183
maximum capacities of the lines). Moreover, in the case of a line failure, the184
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system operator (S.O.) will need to re-dispatch the units to ensure an energy185
dispatch in the network that minimizes the amount of energy not served (in186
case curtailment is inevitable), and to ensure the system stability so that187
no other line becomes overloaded, with the risk of leading to a cascading188
network failure.189
In a uniform pricing market, the re-dispatching strategy is typically im-190
plemented via a counter-trading mechanism, which can be approximated as191
follows [33]: the S.O. receives price-quantity bids for the day-ahead mar-192
ket from the GenCos and price-quantity bids for the subsequent balancing193
market, representing the price at which each GenCo is willing to increase or194
reduce, in terms of production of each unit with respect to the result of the195
DAM schedule, in case there is a need for a re-dispatch. The S.O. would solve196
an OPF problem prior to real-time dispatch, based on the schedule proposed197
in the DAM, to check the schedule feasibility. Typically, this analysis would198
have as primary aim the identification and elimination of network congestion.199
For those units that will have to increase their production, the trans-200
mission adjustments can be paid at the equilibrium price of the production201
increase bids in the upwards BM. While for the units which are required to202
decrease their production, they would ideally bid according to their “avoided203
fuel costs” in the downwards BM, and would be either charged the equi-204
librium price of this market, or a price in accordance to a pay-as-bid rule205
[33].206
We propose to model this market mechanism through a 3-stage model:207
the first stage is an equilibrium problem to obtain the DAM price and sched-208
ule, the second stage is a DC-OPF power flow problem, which represents209
14
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the S.O. decisions, and the third stage is an equilibrium problem to find210
the competition outcome in both the upwards and the downwards BM and,211
subsequently, calculate the correction costs. Both equilibrium models for212
the DAM and BM are formulated as a conjectural-variation problem that213
allows the parametrization of different levels of competition among the Gen-214
Cos through the conjecture price-response parameters [39], considered to be215
exogenously obtained in the problem. This formulation is similar to that216
proposed in [36].217
Competition in the Day-Ahead Market218
Under the simplest assumptions, in the DAM competition each firm i is
searching to maximize its profit following:
max
Π
λi ·
∑
j∈Ji
qDAMj −
∑
j∈Ji
cj(q
DAM
j ) (1)
Subject to:
λi = λ
∗ − θi ·
(∑
j∈Ji
qDAMj −
∑
j∈Ji
q∗DAMj
)
(2)
qj − qDAMj ≥ 0 : (µj) ∀j ∈ J (3)
qDAMj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J (4)
where Π = {λi, qDAMj }. The objective function (1) is the profit function to219
be maximized and it is equal to the revenues obtained from the production in220
the DAM
(
λi ·
∑
j∈Ji
qDAMj
)
minus the costs of production
(∑
j∈Ji
cj(q
DAM
j )
)
.221
The price (λi) represents GenCo (i) estimation of the DAM price. Since222
we assume that the participating GenCos are price makers, their production223
decisions should endogenously determine the market price. This strategic224
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behavior is represented with constraint (2) by means of the conjecture-price225
response parameter (θi = − ∂λi/∂qDAMj ). In equilibrium, the single DAM226
equilibrium price is (λ∗) and the optimal quantity produced is (q∗DAMj ). Con-227
straint (2) ensures that both upwards and downwards deviations in the pro-228
duction from the optimal production levels reduce the company profits, thus229
ensuring that the price estimate (λi) is equal to the equilibrium price (λ
∗).230
Constraints (3) and (4) are the boundaries of the production variables.231
Competition in the Balancing Market232
In case of schedule infeasibilities due to network constraints, generation233
units will have to be re-dispatched. Some units will have to increase, while234
others will have to reduce their productions. In a market context, this re-235
scheduling will be achieved by referring to the bids in both the upwards236
and the downwards BM. It is, therefore, very likely that competing GenCos237
will choose their bids strategically to maximize their profits as well in this238
subsequent mechanism. We can approximate the GenCos strategic behavior239
in the BM by solving an optimization problem where each GenCo seeks to240
maximize its profit. The BM optimization problem for each firm (i) can be241
formulated as:242
max
∆
γi ·
∑
j∈Ji
xBMj − (ψi + λ∗) ·
∑
j∈Ji
zBMj −
∑
j∈Ji
cj(x
BM
j − zBMj ) (5)
Subject to:
γi = γ
∗ − βi ·
(∑
j∈Ji
xBMj −
∑
j∈Ji
x∗BMj
)
(6)
16
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ψi = ψ
∗ − φi ·
(∑
j∈Ji
zBMj −
∑
j∈Ji
z∗BMj
)
(7)
qj · uOPFj − xBMj ≥ 0 : (νj) ∀j ∈ J (8)
qj − qDAMj − xBMj ≥ 0 : (ξj) ∀j ∈ J (9)
qDAMj · wOPFj − zBMj ≥ 0 : (δj) ∀j ∈ J (10)
xBMj ≥ 0, zBMj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ J (11){
qDAMj
} ∈ arg Π (12){
uOPFj , w
OPF
j
} ∈ arg Ξ (13)
where ∆ = {γi, ψi, xBMj , zBMj }. The objective function (5) represents the243
profit function for each GenCo (i). (xBMj ) and (z
BM
j ) are the decision vari-244
ables for the upwards and the downwards production quantities, respectively,245
while (γi) and (ψi) are the market prices for the upwards and the downwards246
BM respectively. It is important to note that the revenues from the down-247
wards balancing market (ψi ·
∑
j∈Ji
zBMj ) are represented as a negative term248
in the profit function, this is to portray that competing firms will perceive249
them as a charge, and calculate their bids in accordance to their avoided fuel250
cost resulting from the reduced real time production. Moreover, the loss of251
profit from not producing in the DAM is illustrated by subtracting the term252
(λ∗ ·
∑
j∈Ji
zBMj ), where at this stage the DAM price (λ) is known. Constraints253
(6) and (7) ensure that the optimization output is equal to the equilibrium254
output of the market, and follow the same explanation given for constraint255
(2). The conjecture price-responses for the upwards BM and the downwards256
BM are (βi = − ∂γi/∂xBMj ) and (φi = ∂ψi/∂zBMj ), respectively.257
258
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Constraints (8)-(11) are the boundaries for the decision variables. (uOPFj )259
and (wOPFj ) are binary decision variables from the DC-OPF problem, they260
represent the state of the units which will be able to increase or decrease261
their productions respectively, in order to correct the real time dispatch. If262
(uOPFj ) or (w
OPF
j ) is equal to 1, it means that the respective unit (j) can263
participate in the upwards or in the downwards BM, respectively; other-264
wise, it can not. This is to ensure a simplified, yet realistic, representation265
of the market, where no unit can participate in the BM unless it is physi-266
cally located on a network bus where the BM is activated in order to solve267
the congestion. Finally, equations (12) and (13) indicate that the variables268
{qDAMj } and {uOPFj , wOPFj } are the output of the decision variables in the269
DAM market problem and the DC-OPF problem, respectively.270
Market Clearing Conditions271
Since we seek to find the equilibrium market outcome, we need to define
the market clearing equations. These equations are the governing condi-
tions that link the individual GenCos optimization problems together. For
a uniform-pricing DAM, the total energy production has to be equal to the
total demand, or: ∑
j∈J
qDAMj = D ∀j ∈ J (14)
Similarly, for the BM, the sum of the increased or reduced production is
equal to the sum of the energy required for the upwards-balancing (UB) or
the downwards-balancing (DB), respectively, or:∑
j∈J
xBMj = UB ∀j ∈ J (15)
18
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∑
j∈J
zBMj = DB ∀j ∈ J (16)
Equilibrium problem formulation272
For the DAM problem, the corresponding MCP is defined by finding the273
system of equations which corresponds to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)274
conditions of the problem (1) to (4), after substituting for (λi) by the right-275
hand side of constraint (2) and adding the market clearing condition (14).276
The DAM-MCP is, thus, defined as:
0 ≤ q∗DAMj ⊥ −λ∗ + θi ·
∑
j∈Ji
q∗DAMj + MCj
(
q∗DAMj
)
+ µj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji, ∀i ∈ I
(17)
0 ≤ µj ⊥ qj − q∗DAMj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji, ∀i ∈ I (18)∑
j∈J
qDAMj = D : λ (19)
where the DAM price (λ) is obtained as the dual-variable of the market clear-277
ing constraint (19). All other constraints are solved for all units (j) belonging278
to GenCo (i), and for all GenCos.279
280
Similarly, we define the BM-MCP as:
0 ≤ x∗BMj ⊥ −γ∗+βi·
∑
j∈Ji
x∗BMj +MCj
(
x∗BMj − z∗BMj
)
+ νj + ξj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji,∀i ∈ I
(20)
0 ≤ z∗BMj ⊥ ψ∗+λ∗+φi·
∑
j∈Ji
z∗BMj −MCj
(
x∗BMj − z∗BMj
)
+ δj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji,∀i ∈ I
(21)
0 ≤ νj ⊥ qj · uOPFj − x∗BMj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji, ∀i ∈ I (22)
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0 ≤ ξj ⊥ qj − q∗DAMj − x∗BMj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji, ∀i ∈ I (23)
0 ≤ δj ⊥ q∗DAMj · wOPFj − z∗BMj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Ji,∀i ∈ I (24)∑
j∈J
xBMj = UB : γ (25)
∑
j∈J
zBMj = DB : ψ (26)
where equations (20) to (24) correspond to the KKT conditions of the prob-281
lem (5)–(13), and equations (25) and (26) are the market clearing conditions282
as previously described. The market prices (γ) and (ψ) are obtained as the283
dual-variables of the market clearing conditions of the upwards BM (25), and284
that of the downwards BM (26), respectively.285
Direct-Current (DC) Optimal Power Flow Model286
The network’s operating decisions by the S.O. taking into account the287
technical representation of the electricity network is modeled through a DC-288
OPF problem. This problem is formulated as a mixed-integer linear pro-289
gramming problem as follows:290
min
Ξ
∑
a∈N
censa · xvga (27)
subject to:∑
j∈Ja
qOPFj +
∑
a′∈N
F(a,a′) = Da − xvga , ∀a ∈ N, ∀(a, a′) ∈ L (28)
F(a,a′) = ms(a,a′)B(a,a′) (δa − δa′) , ∀(a, a′) ∈ L (29)∑
j∈Ja
qOPFj =
∑
j∈Ja
qDAMj +
∑
j∈Ja
xOPFj −
∑
j∈Ja
zOPFj , ∀j ∈ Ja, ∀a ∈ N (30)
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0 ≤
∑
j∈Ja
qOPFj ≤
∑
j∈Ja
qj, ∀j ∈ Ja, ∀a ∈ N (31)
0 ≤
∑
j∈Ja
xOPFj ≤
∑
j∈Ja
qj · uOPFa , ∀j ∈ Ja, ∀a ∈ N (32)
0 ≤
∑
j∈Ja
zOPFj ≤
∑
j∈Ja
qj · wOPFa · (1− uOPFa ), ∀j ∈ Ja, ∀a ∈ N (33)
0 ≤ xvga ≤ Da, ∀a ∈ N (34)
δ1 = 0 (35)
uOPFa , w
OPF
a ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J (36)
where Ξ = {qOPFj , xOPFj , zOPFj , xvga , F(a,a′), δa, δa′ , uOPFa , wOPFa }. The291
objective function (27) of the S.O. is to minimize the energy not served292
in the network, given the DAM schedule, subject to the network technical293
constraints. (xvga ) is the amount of energy not served at each network bus (a),294
which is obtained as the production value of a virtual-generator (vg) added295
to this network bus. (censa) is the cost of energy not served at bus (a) and296
is represented as the cost of production of the respective (vg). (qOPFj ) is the297
final production output as found in the DC-OPF and
(∑
j∈Ja
xOPFj ,
∑
j∈Ja
zOPFj
)
298
are the total upwards and downwards amounts of energy required per network299
bus a. Constraint (28) is the supply-demand balance equation considering300
the power flows in the network (F(a,a′)), which are either entering (positive)301
or leaving (negative) bus (a). Constraint (29) defines the active power flow302
in the different lines of the network, where (B(a,a′)) is the line susceptance303
and (δa) is the voltage-angle at each bus. The mechanical state of each304
line (ms(a,a′)) is an exogenous parameter: it takes the value of 1 if the line305
is active and the value of 0 if the line fails, and it is how the line failure306
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status is represented in the dispatch problem. Constraint (30) ensures the307
consistency between the decisions taken in the final production schedule and308
the DAM bidding schedule. Constraints (31) to (34) are the boundaries of the309
decision variables, namely the production quantity (qOPFj ), the upwards and310
the downwards production required (xOPFj ) and (z
OPF
j ), respectively. (u
OPF
a )311
is a binary decision variable, which is equal to 1 if the units at bus (a) are312
required to increase their production to solve a network constraint and is313
equal to 0 otherwise. Similarly, (wOPFa ) is a binary decision variables, which314
is equal to 1 if the units at bus (a) are required to reduce their production315
and 0 otherwise. The term (1− uOPFa ) in constraint (33) ensures that units316
on the same bus can not be required to increase and reduce their productions317
at the same time. Finally, constraint (35) sets the bus voltage-angle reference318
point at bus (1).319
Risk Index and Assessment Method320
To adopt a quantitative definition of risk, we refer to expected conse-
quence as the product of the probability of occurrence of an undesired event
(e.g. transmission line failure) and the resulting consequence [18]. To take
into account the negative effect of several undesired events, the definition is
extended by summing all relevant consequence contributions. Formally, we
can express the risk as:
Risk(R) =
∑
n
p(En) · Sev(En) (37)
where n is the event index, p(En) is the probability of occurrence of the321
undesired event En and Sev(En) is the severity of the related consequences.322
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Probability Model323
We adhere to the intrinsic failure characteristics of the transmission lines324
to calculate the probability of line failure, extrapolating the historical data of325
the permanent outage rate for each line and its respective outage duration in326
hours. However, different contributions can be considered, for example that327
of a line failure due to voltage instability caused by a stochastic renewable328
production source [28] or the probability of failure resulting from extreme329
weather conditions [19].330
The probability model for the risk assessment is, thus, defined as:
p(El) =
ORl · Tl
Hrs
, ∀l (38)
where l is the transmission line index, ORl is the outage rate per year per331
line, Tl is the average outage duration for transmission line l in hours and332
Hrs is the total number of operating hours per year.333
Severity calculation334
We consider an economic severity function where the risk factor proposed
is calculated based on the system costs encountered due to line failures. We
consider mainly two costs: the costs of energy not served (estimated as a
constant function in terms of e/MW) and the costs arising in a uniform-
pricing market context for correcting the dispatch in real-time production.
The latter represents the economic inefficiencies arising due to the strategic
behavior in multiple-market interactions. Formally, this is formulated as:
Sev(E1l) = censa,l · xvga,l, ∀a ∈ N,∀l ∈ L (39)
Sev(E2l) =
[
γ∗l · x∗BMj,l
]− [(ψ∗l + λ∗) · z∗BMj,l ] , ∀j ∈ J,∀l ∈ L (40)
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Severity function (39) represents the effect of the energy not served, where
(censa,l) is the cost of the energy not served at network bus (a) due to line
(l) failure and (xvga,l) is the amount of energy not served at bus (a) in case
of such failure. Severity function (40) represents the effect of the schedule
correction, considering the amount paid for upwards corrections (γ∗l · x∗BMj,l )
and the amount charged for downwards corrections (ψ∗l · z∗BMj,l ) minus the
savings made from the generation reduction (λ∗ · z∗BMj,l ) , for each line failure
case. The risk assessment index considered is, thus, defined such as:
Risk(El) =
ORl · Tl
Hrs
· [(censa,l · xvga,l) + (γ∗l · x∗BMj,l )− ((ψ∗l + λ∗) · z∗BMj,l )] ,
∀a ∈ N, ∀j ∈ J,∀l ∈ L
(41)
SRisk =
∑
l∈L
Risk(El) (42)
where the aggregated system risk index (42) can be used in the comparison335
of the risk assessment for different power transmission systems.336
3. Solution Method337
The two MCPs formulated can be readily solved with available commer-338
cial solvers. For the present study we use the PATH solver [40] in the GAMS339
environment [41]. For the DC-OPF we use the IBM ILOG-CPLEX solver.340
The aim is to find the final feasible schedule in case of a line failure, tak-341
ing into account the GenCos DAM bidding, and subsequently to find both342
the upwards and the downwards BM prices and quantities bids used for the343
calculation of the risk index. For this multi-stage problem, we propose a344
solution method as follows:345
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1. Solve the DAM-MCP (17)-(19) to obtain the equilibrium DAM price346
(λ∗) and the generation units quantities bids (q∗DAMj ).347
2. Solve the DC-OPF problem (27)-(36) given (q∗DAMj ) to obtain (q
OPF
j ,348
xOPFj , z
OPF
j , x
vg
a , F(a,a′), δa, δa′ , u
OPF
a , w
OPF
a ).349
3. Calculate the total energy required for the upwards-balancing (UB)
and the downwards-balancing (DB):
UB =
∑
j∈J
xOPFj (43)
DB =
∑
j∈J
zOPFj (44)
4. Since (uOPFa ) and (w
OPF
a ) are the upwards and downwards binary state
for network bus (a), we translate these status to each unit (j) belonging
to bus (a):
uOPFj =
1, if u
OPF
a = 1 and j ∈ Ja
0, otherwise
(45)
wOPFj =
1, if w
OPF
a = 1 and j ∈ Ja
0, otherwise
(46)
5. Solve the BM-MCP (20)-(26) given the values calculated in (43)-(46),350
and the known DAM price (λ∗), to obtain the BM upwards and down-351
wards equilibrium market prices (γ∗, ψ∗) and quantities bids (x∗BMj ,352
z∗BMj ), respectively.353
6. Calculate the risk index (41) for each line failure and finally the aggre-354
gated index (42).355
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4. Case study356
Numerical Example357
The power system under study is a 6-bus system adapted from the IEEE358
6-bus Reliability Test System [38]. Figure (1) shows the single line diagram of359
the adapted RBTS system. As shown, the system has 2 PV buses containing360
11 generation units (units 1 to 11), 5 PQ buses , and 7 transmission lines.361
Units 12 to 17 are the virtual generators used for the calculation of the362
amount of energy not served in their respective demand bus. The minimum363
and the maximum ratings of the generating units are 5 MW and 40 MW,364
respectively. The voltage level of the transmission system is 230 kV. The365
system has a peak load of 185 MW and the total installed capacity amounts366
to 240 MW. Table (1) illustrates the breakdown of the total available capacity367
and peak hour demand per network bus. Since no reactive power is considered368
in the network, it is assumed that bus voltages magnitudes are constant and369
equal to 1pu. Finally, Table (2) summarizes the technical characteristics of370
the transmission lines.371
Generation Units Breakdown in the Network372
Table (3) summarizes the maximum capacities and the cost data for each373
of the generation units. Table (4) illustrates the capacity limits and cost data374
for the virtual units. The ENS cost is calculated on the basis of 120 e/MWh,375
multiplied by the percentage of the demand present at the respective network376
bus. The capacity limits for the VGs are set to the maximum amount of load377
in each bus to ensure that no VG compensates for load shedding located in378
any network bus other than where it is placed. Finally, Table (5) illustrates379
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the transmission lines maximum capacities, the outage data expressed as the380
number of complete line outage for each line per year and the duration of this381
outage in hours. It is important to note that the maximum line capacities are382
chosen such that they would always be operated close to their limits under383
normal operating conditions (i.e. under no failure).384
GenCos Characterization385
Table (6) illustrates the GenCos characteristics. It is assumed that 4386
GenCos are competing in both markets, each owning different generation mix387
and different total production capacities. For the DAM and the BM, GenCos388
are assumed to have the ability to act strategically, which is represented by389
the conjectured-price response terms, as previously discussed. The values of390
the conjectured-price response for the DAM (θi) is assumed to be equal to391
0.2 for GenCos 1, 2 and 4, and equal to 0.1 for GenCo 3. This is to represent392
that a GenCo having the smallest capacity and some of the most expensive393
units (such as GenCo 3) would typically have less chances to exercise market394
power than the GenCos which have cheaper units more often committed. For395
the BM, the conjectured-price response (βi and φi) are assumed to be equal396
to 0.1 for all GenCos. Finally, it is assumed that the cost functions for the397
generation units are linear.398
5. Results399
We solve the model simulating 8 different cases: the “base case”, where400
we do not consider any network line failures and is, thus, considered as the401
benchmark or the “business-as-usual” case for an hourly competition in a402
power system and cases (I to VII), where we consider the separate effects403
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of line 1 to line 7 failure, respectively. All the results reported consider the404
oligopolistic behavior of the GenCos, as the values of the conjectured-price405
response parameters in all markets (θ, β and φ) are different from zero.406
Table (7) illustrates the production quantity bids for all GenCos obtained407
from the DAM-MCP, for all cases considered. Since the bidding decisions in408
the DAM do not depend on the line failure case 1, the resulting bids do409
not change according the different line failures. These results only depend410
on the assumed level of the conjectured-price response parameters and the411
intrinsic characteristics of the generation units. It is important to note that412
units 3 to 11 possess enough capacity to satisfy all the network demand413
at a lower market price equal to 2 or slightly higher than unit 3 marginal414
cost 3. However, since we model an oligopolistic market where (θi 6= 0),415
the equilibrium model correctly portrays the GenCos behavior where units416
3 and 4 retract quantities offered to ensure that the more expensive units (1417
and 2) are committed and, thus, increase the uniform clearing market-price418
to the λ level shown in Table (13). These results are consistent with our419
expectations, and with the studies reviewed, which consider the ability of420
GenCos to exercise market power. Most notably, for the no-congestion case421
presented in [35], where market power is equally parametrized by conjecture422
price-response parameters, the authors reported similar results, showing that423
GenCos can increase the market price above the marginal level by modifying424
1We assume that the failure occurs after the DAM gate-closure and close to real-time
dispatch.
2In case of perfect competition
3Both units 1 and 2 have higher marginal costs and typically would not be committed.
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the production offers of their units.425
Table (8) summarizes the aggregation of the GenCos bids per network426
bus to clearly illustrate how the S.O. would validate the feasibility of the427
schedule in the different failure cases.428
Table (9) illustrates the solution of the DC-OPF problem which has the429
objective of obtaining the real feasible schedule. It is shown that compared430
to the pre-failures schedule, the different failure cases induce the need for431
some upwards or downwards production adjustments along the buses with432
active power output. This amount varies from one case to the other, already433
providing an insight on the impact of the failure in terms of the amount of434
ENS.435
The amounts of the ENS per network bus calculated based on the mini-436
mum cost objective are summarized in Table (10). It is shown that in both437
the no failure case and Case I there is no ENS in the network. Since the438
network flow limits can initially accomodate the required power dispatch, it439
is clear that the schedule would remain unchanged if no failure occurs. If line440
1 fails, the cheaper generation units 5 to 11 at bus 2 can no longer export all441
of their production, a schedule correction is required, calling upon the more442
expensive units 1 to 4 located at bus 1. However, the rest of the network can443
still accomodate this modified schedule, and hence, no demand is curtailed.444
The ENS amount varies in all other cases based on the updated topology of445
the network, and on how much it allows for demand coverage.446
Given these results, the BM-MCP is solved, and the equilibrium results of447
the upwards and the downwards BM obtained are summarized in Tables (11)448
and (12), respectively. The upwards balancing market is activated only in the449
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case of line 1 failure since it is the only failure case where there are generation450
units on a network bus (bus 1) that have enough available upwards capacity451
to compensate for the reductions required on the other bus (bus 2). In all the452
other cases, there exist no units on the different buses that can compensate453
for the power losses in the network and, therefore, demand is curtailed, and454
only the downwards BM is activated.455
The resulting upwards (γ) and downwards (ψ) BM prices are summarized456
in Table (13). For Case I, the upwards BM (γ) is different than zero since the457
market is activated. However, as shown, this market price is lower than the458
DAM price (λ). This is due to the strategic behavior of the GenCos in the459
DAM, where the expensive units (1 and 2) have already been committed to460
their maximum capacities and, subsequently, only the cheaper units (3 and 4)461
can participate in the subsequent market. The price, however, is still higher462
than the marginal cost of both units 3 and 4, similarly representing the effect463
of the parametrized strategic behavior of the GenCos in this market.464
The analysis of the strategic bidding in the BM resembles that given465
for the DAM. GenCos retract quantities offered by the cheaper units in the466
upwards BM to ensure an increase in the market price. In the downwards467
BM, this strategy works in the opposite sense: ideally the most expensive468
unit able to reduce is committed for the downwards balancing, resulting469
in the highest market price (highest since this market price is represented470
as a negative term in the GenCos profit function). However, GenCos with471
expensive units have incentives to bid lower quantities so that cheaper units472
are committed for downwards balancing, thus ensuring a lower downwards473
market price and, therefore, a higher profit. For a clear illustration of this474
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concept, it is important to consider that in the downwards BM, GenCos are475
only interested to participate if they are compensated in accordance to their476
“avoided fuel cost”, or otherwise, the net profit they would have made by477
being active in the DAM. Expensive units save more cost by being selected478
to reduce their production and, therefore, to compensate for their profit479
loss, are willing to bid higher. This is shown in downwards BM price (ψ)480
in Table (13). First, note that the negative market price indicates that481
the GenCos would actually be compensated for their participation in this482
market. For cases I to IV, units with cheaper marginal cost are required to483
reduce their productions. As discussed, their participation in this market484
drives the negative prices down and constitute a higher charge to be paid485
for their participation. For cases V to VII, only expensive units are called486
upon, resulting in higher negative prices and therefore a lower charge for487
their participation.488
Since none of the reviewed studies considers explicitly the DAM and BM489
separation, we validate the results obtained by comparing them to what we490
would obtain out of the perfect competition outcome, which is well known491
from economics theory [42] and can be calculated analytically. For simple il-492
lustration, consider the perfect competition BM solution of Case IV. This can493
be obtained in the model by setting the conjecture-price response parameters494
(β and φ) to zero for all the GenCos, and solving for the required correc-495
tions, to obtain the bidding quantities and the market prices. We focus on496
the downwards BM, since it is the only correction market active in this case.497
Active units on bus 2 are required to bid for a reduction of 0.83 MWh; in498
this setting, and according to the outcome of perfect competition, we would499
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expect that one of the most expensive units on this network bus (one with500
a marginal cost of 0.8 e/ MWh) would bid its opportunity cost to undergo501
this reduction. This would be calculated as follows: the total revenue loss502
from reducing 0.83 MWh is this amount multiplied by the DAM price, or503
0.83 ∗ 19.125 = 15.874 e; the production cost saved is equal to the marginal504
cost multiplied by the reduced amount, or 0.8 ∗ 0.83 = 0.664 e. Therefore,505
this GenCo would be willing to participate in the market if it was at least506
compensated the marginal loss of (0.664− 15.874)/0.83 = −18.325 e/MWh.507
This is exactly the outcome obtained by solving the model, resulting in unit 5508
offering 0.83 MWh reduction and a clearing market price of -18.325 e/MWh.509
Notice that a much less competitive output occurs if one of the cheaper units510
with a marginal cost of 0.5 e/MWh become the marginal unit, resulting in a511
clearing price of -18.625 e/MWh. This is correctly portrayed in the results512
reported in Table (13), where we have considered a departure from the per-513
fect competition outcome by setting the parameter φ 6= 0, which leads to a514
different offering than that of perfect competition and a consistently worse515
market clearing price equal to -18.367 e/MWh. This is similar for all the516
other cases presented.517
The ENS and the schedule correction costs arising due to network line518
failure are thus calculated, and are summarized in Table (14). It can be seen519
that, in this numerical example, the ENS cost is significantly higher than520
the correction cost, indicating that it remains the most significant cost to521
consider for the risk assessment. However, it is important to note that a line522
failure can induce a need for a schedule correction without giving rise to ENS523
in the network, such as in Case I. Note also that this correction cost can be524
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positive or negative (from the S.O. perspective) depending on the failed line525
and the resulting dispatch requirements, as well as the level of competition526
in the BM. The total cost used to calculate the risk index is summarized in527
Table (14).528
Finally, the risk index values for all cases are shown in Table (15). This529
index is to be used for identifying the effect of the failure taking into consider-530
ation the market interactions among the GenCos, and can serve in comparing531
the impact of the different failures. An important observation, is that within532
a similar market context, a risk index that only considers the cost of ENS533
in the severity function such as that presented in [31], would fail to identify534
Case I presented in the system risk assessment. Moreover, it can underesti-535
mate, or overestimate the economic impact of any of the failures, due to the536
effects arising from the exercise of market power. Such an impact is shown to537
become increasingly relevant as we depart further from the perfect competi-538
tion behavior and portray GenCos that are able to manipulate the markets539
to gain more profits.540
In the previous section, we have analyzed in some depth a case study541
based on the risk assessment method proposed. Next, we examine how much542
this assessment is sensitive to the assumed level of competitiveness.543
6. Sensitivity Analysis544
Apart from the specific characteristics of the system under study (e.g. the545
assumed generation units location, variable costs, units distribution among546
the GenCos, etc.), the resulting quantity bids, schedules and market prices in547
the model, and subsequently the risk level are dependent on the assumptions548
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related to the conjectured-price responses (θi, βi, and φi) in the different549
markets. As previously mentioned, these parameters are considered as being550
exogenous in our work but it has been shown that they can be estimated or551
endogenously calculated in real markets [43]. Therefore, it is of interest to552
conduct a sensitivity analysis for these parameters to understand their effect553
on system risk.554
We conduct the analysis by solving the 7 cases of line failure while varying555
the value of the conjecture price-response parameters (θi, βi, and φi) from 0556
to 1 with step size of 0.1, one at a time, resulting in a total of 9,317 cases.557
We, then, aggregate the different costs arising and the risk indices for all 7558
failure cases, to represent each of them as a single value under each level of559
competition, resulting in a total of 1,331 aggregated schedule correction costs560
and risk indices. The results are then plotted for a clear representation of561
the changes in the cost and/or risk index with respect to the changes in the562
different parameters. Since the plots produced are 4 dimensional, we divide563
each plot into 3 Figures for clear representation, where we fix the value of564
one parameter in each and plot the other two along with one of the variables.565
Figure (2) illustrates the result of the sensitivity analysis for the schedule566
correction costs arising due to all 7 line failures, with respect to the compe-567
tition parameters. In Figures (2a, 2b and 2c) the value of parameters (θ, β568
and φ) are fixed to zero. The ENS costs are not included in these graphs569
as they are constant for all the cases and do not change with the change in570
the competition parameters. It can be seen in Figure (2a) that the correc-571
tion cost clearly increases as we increase the conjectured-price response (i.e.572
market power) of the GenCos in both the upwards (β) and the downwards573
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(φ) BM. Furthermore, the parameter (φ) for the downwards BM affects this574
correction cost much more than that of the upwards BM (β). As we have575
shown in the previous section, the different line failures simulated more often576
resulted in the activation of the downwards BM than the upwards one. The577
lowest cost resulting from setting the parameters (β) and (φ) equal to zero578
(simulating the perfect competition case) is −263.97 e, indicating that the579
S.O. would actually receive back some of the costs paid for the generation in580
the DAM as they would finally not produce. On the other hand, assuming581
the highest exercise of market power for all GenCos in both BM results in582
a cost of 5292.75 e, highlighting the big impact that the exercise of market583
power can have on the system cost.584
Figures (2b, 2c) show that the cost increasing trend does not hold with585
increasing the market power in the DAM through the parameter (θ). This is586
because the change in (θ) for each GenCo results in a change in their bidding587
behavior in the DAM; these different starting schedules lead to different588
correction requirements as the lines fail, possibly leading to less or cheaper589
corrections compared to the perfect competition schedule. This counter-590
intuitive result is only due to the fact that we do not take into consideration591
the energy price in the DAM, which significantly increases as we increase the592
market power of the GenCos in this market. Figures (3b, 3c) illustrate the593
cost trend when we include the DAM energy cost. It is clear how important594
the increase in the DAM price affects the system costs, as we increase the595
parameter (θ). Finally, although the results are shown for the values of the596
parameters (θ, β, and φ) set to zero, similar patterns are found when they597
are set to different levels (i.e. 0.1 or 0.9).598
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Since we are interested in quantifying the economic risk of line failures,599
we revert to representing the sensitivity of the risk index without taking into600
account the energy cost in the DAM. Figure (4) illustrates the sensitivity601
analysis of the aggregated risk index and shows that it follows closely the602
changes in the correction cost of the system shown in Figure (2). Such603
representation could be especially useful in comparing the effect of different604
levels of competition among the GenCos.605
7. Conclusion606
In the work presented in this paper, a novel risk assessment method for607
network failures in an electricity market environment has been proposed.608
The electricity market design considered is a uniform-pricing market with609
counter-trading mechanism for correcting any network infeasibilities. A 3-610
stage model has been proposed to model the operation of the electricity611
system, consisting of:612
• A conjectural-variation equilibrium model for simulating the compe-613
tition in the DAM where the GenCos strategic behavior is modeled614
through a conjectured-price response parameter.615
• A DC-OPF model to simulate the feasible power dispatch in case of a616
line failure.617
• A conjectural-variation equilibrium model for simulating the counter-618
trading mechanism, where the different GenCos submit bids for both619
upwards and downwards correction of the dispatch.620
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Finally, an economic risk index has been proposed, which takes into account621
the economic effects of a line failure, namely the cost of ENS and the schedule622
correction cost.623
The proposed method has been applied to a case study adapted from624
the IEEE 6-bus reliability test system and the results have been analyzed625
both technically and economically. Finally, a sensitivity analysis has been626
performed to examine the effect of the changes in the competitiveness level of627
the different market participants, portrayed in our model by the conjectured-628
price response parameters, assumed to be exogenous to the problem.629
It is shown that within a uniform-pricing market context, a cost arises630
due to the schedule correction induced by a network contingency. Such a cost631
is not reflected in the technical risk indices typically calculated, for example,632
on the basis of voltage level and circuit flow violations, and is often neglected633
also in the economic risk indices that typically consider only the ENS cost.634
Our results show that this correction cost is, in fact, non-negligible and that635
considering it is important because it could alter the relative importance of636
the network contingencies. The proposed assessment can help the decision637
maker properly categorizing the impact of the different line failures within a638
uniform pricing market; this can be useful for deciding on maintenance sched-639
ules, for example. Policy implications and market design recommendations640
could also be derived but this is outside the scope of the present work.641
Moreover, recognizing that the output of the model depends on the val-642
ues of the conjectured-price response parameters assumed for the different643
markets, the sensitivity analysis performed confirms that there is a linearly644
increasing risk trend as we set those parameters to portray a less competitive645
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behavior from the GenCos in the BM, which is expected as it is where the646
correction costs arise. This is not the case when varying the competitiveness647
level of the GenCos in the DAM, as it is shown that this would result in648
different initial production schedules and, therefore, different correction re-649
quirements. It is, thus, necessary to be careful in estimating and setting the650
values of these parameters when applying this assessment method.651
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Figure 1: Generation units placement on the RBTS Single line diagram.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for the correction cost arising due to line failures
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Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for the total system costs (including energy cost in the DAM)
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis for the aggregated risk index
Table 1: Bus Power Capacity and Bus Demand.
Bus (a) Total Available Capacity
(MW)
Demand (MW)
1 110.00 0.00
2 130.00 20.00
3 0.00 85.00
4 0.00 40.00
5 0.00 20.00
6 0.00 20.00
Total 240.00 185.00
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Table 2: Transmission lines Characterization
Buses
Line (l) From (a) To (a′) Line
Length
(Km)
Resistance
R (p.u.)
Reactance
X (p.u)
Susceptance
B (p.u)
1 1 2 200 0.0912 0.480 2.010
2 1 3 75 0.0342 0.180 5.362
3 2 4 250 0.1140 0.600 1.608
4 3 4 50 0.0228 0.120 8.043
5 3 5 50 0.0228 0.120 8.043
6 4 5 50 0.0228 0.120 8.043
7 5 6 50 0.0228 0.120 8.043
100 MVA base
230 kV base
Table 3: Generation Units Capacities and Cost Data.
Variable costs, e/MWh
Unit (j) Technology Capacity
(MW)
Fuel Cost Operation
Cost
Total Vari-
able Cost
1 Thermal 10.00 10.00 3.50 13.50
2 Thermal 20.00 9.75 2.75 12.50
3 Thermal 40.00 9.75 2.50 12.25
4 Thermal 40.00 9.50 2.50 12.00
5 Hydro 5.00 0.65 0.15 0.80
6 Hydro 5.00 0.65 0.15 0.80
7 Hydro 20.00 0.45 0.05 0.50
8 Hydro 20.00 0.45 0.05 0.50
9 Hydro 20.00 0.45 0.05 0.50
10 Hydro 20.00 0.45 0.05 0.50
11 Hydro 40.00 0.45 0.05 0.50
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Table 4: Load Shedding (Virtual Generators) cost data.
Bus (a) Technology Capacity (MW) ENS Cost
(e/MWh)
2 Virtual Generator 20.00 132.97
3 Virtual Generator 85.00 175.13
4 Virtual Generator 40.00 145.94
5 Virtual Generator 20.00 132.97
6 Virtual Generator 20.00 132.97
Table 5: Transmission lines Capacities and outage data
Buses
Line (l) From (a) To (a′) Maximum
Line Ca-
pacity
(MW)
Permanent
Outage
rate (per
year)
Outage
duration
(hours)
1 1 2 45.00 4.00 15.00
2 1 3 100.00 1.50 15.00
3 2 4 70.00 5.00 15.00
4 3 4 20.00 1.00 15.00
5 3 5 20.00 1.00 15.00
6 4 5 25.00 1.00 15.00
7 5 6 20.00 2.00 15.00
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Table 6: Characterization of GenCos
Agent θi βi φi Unit Bus Marginal
Cost
qj
i
[
e/MWh
MW
] [
e/MWh
MW
] [
e/MWh
MW
]
j a [e/MWh][MW ]
1 0.2 0.1 0.1
3 1 12.25 40.00
5 2 0.80 5.00
7 2 0.50 20.00
2 0.2 0.1 0.1
8 2 0.50 20.00
10 2 0.50 20.00
11 2 0.50 40.00
3 0.1 0.1 0.1
1 1 13.50 10.00
2 1 12.50 20.00
6 2 0.80 5.00
4 0.2 0.1 0.1
4 1 12.00 40.00
9 2 0.50 20.00
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Table 7: GenCos DAM quantity bids
qDAMj [MWh]
Agent
i
Unit
j
No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
1
3 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38 9.38
5 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
7 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
2
8 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
10 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
11 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
3
1 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
2 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
6 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
4
4 15.62 15.62 15.62 15.62 15.62 15.62 15.62 15.62
9 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
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Table 8: GenCos quantity bids per network bus (a)
∑
j∈Ja
qDAMj [MWh]
Bus
(a)
No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
1 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00 55.00
2 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00 130.00
Table 9: Feasible production schedule per network bus (a)
∑
j∈Ja
qOPFj [MWh]
Bus
(a)
No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
1 55.00 95.00 0.00 55.00 55.00 42.33 41.67 39.88
2 130.00 90.00 90.00 65.00 129.17 127.67 123.33 125.12
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Table 10: Amount of ENS per network bus (a)
xvga [MWh]
Bus
(a)
No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 0.00 55.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 0.83 15.00 0.00 20.00
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Table 11: GenCos quantity bids in the Upwards Balancing Market
x∗BMj [MWh]
Agent Unit No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
1
3 0.00 18.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4
4 0.00 21.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 12: GenCos quantity bids in the downwards Balancing Market
z∗BMj [MWh]
Agent Unit No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
1
3 0.00 0.00 9.38 0.00 0.00 3.75 6.25 6.25
5 0.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 0.415 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.00 6.67 7.29 15.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2
8 0.00 11.67 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 1.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3
1 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
2 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 0.00 5.00 0.00 5.00 0.415 0.00 0.00 0.00
4
4 0.00 0.00 15.62 0.00 0.00 1.25 3.75 3.75
9 0.00 11.67 6.04 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 13: DAM and BM prices
Market Prices [e/ MWh]
Market No Fail-
ure
Case I Case II Case III Case IV Case V Case VI Case
VII
λ 19.125 19.125 19.125 19.125 19.125 19.125 19.125 19.125
γ 0 14.125 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ψ 0 -19.792 -20.792 -20.625 -18.367 -7.250 -7.50 -7.50
Table 14: Costs arising due to network line failures
No Failure Case I Case II Case III Case IV Case V Case VI Case VII
Probability 0.68% 0.26% 0.86% 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.34%
ENS Cost
[e]
0.00 0.00 14951.50 8967.55 110.80 1994.55 2659.40 2659.40
Correction
Cost [e]
0.00 591.67 158.33 97.50 -0.63 -178.13 -232.50 -232.50
Total Cost
[e]
0.00 591.67 15109.83 9065.05 110.17 1816.42 2426.90 2426.90
Table 15: Risk Index for the network
No
Fail-
ure
Case
I
Case
II
Case
III
Case
IV
Case
V
Case
VI
Case
VII
Risk
Index
0.00 4.02 39.29 77.96 0.18 3.09 4.13 8.25
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• A risk assessment method for power network failures in a market context is proposed. 
• It quantifies the economic impact due to the strategic reactions of the participants. 
• The method consists of game theory models and a DC-OPF model solved sequentially. 
• Exercise of market power by participants alters the risk level of the network failure. 
 
